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Abstract 
Since the idea of attributions was famously discussed by Fritz Heider (1958), a wide 
array of empirical research has focused on the phenomenon.  Included within the sphere 
of attributional theories are internal attributions, which have been of particular interest to 
the psychological community for decades.  Although there is no comprehensive theory 
for why people make these attributions, literature points to establishing control as a 
possible motivator.  In addition, research suggests that people may make more extreme 
internal attributions about minorities, particularly when they are not aware they are 
relying on stereotypes. Participants (N = 377) observed a modified version of the 
quizmaster paradigm (Ross, Amabile & Steinmetz, 1977), which relies on the 
Fundamental Attribution Error. They first completed a control manipulation that either 
deprived their sense of person control or left it unaffected. Then, they watched a video 
depicting the quizmaster paradigm with either a black contestant or a white contestant. 
After the video, they rated quizmasters, contestants and themselves based on intelligence. 
Although the quizmaster paradigm proved to be robust, neither Race nor Control affected 
the strength of the internal attributions participants made. The lack of significant findings 
suggest that further research needs to be conducted to ascertain the causality of internal 
attributions. 
 
Keywords: Internal Attributions, Fundamental Attribution Error, Control, Racial Biases   
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Why we Ask Why: 
The Ways in Which Control and Stereotyping Biases Affect Internal Attributions 
Despite decades of research devoted to the ways we explain human behavior, 
many questions on this topic remain unanswered. Classic research on the perceptions of 
observed behavior have unearthed many phenomena, with some of the most influential 
being attribution theories. (Gilbert & Malone, 1995; Heider, 1958; Liu & Steele, 1986; 
Peturson, Cramer & Pomerleau, 2011; Pittman & Pittman, 1980; Ross, 1977; Ross, 
Amabile & Steinmetz, 1977). Attribution theories have accumulated much interest since 
their inception, with some psychologists referring to them as some of the most 
fundamental phenomena to social psychology (Gilbert & Malone, 1995; Ross, 1977). 
Despite the wealth of research attribution theories have inspired, very few studies have 
focused on why they occur. Instead, much of the existing literature focuses on how they 
occur. Due to this, there is no widely accepted model for explaining attribution theories. 
Given the impact and breadth of interest they have sparked within the field of 
psychology, it is only appropriate that further research focuses on determining the 
motivations for making attributions. 
Attributions  
Attribution theories are a collection of biases, errors, and paradigms that utilize 
similar ideas and produce similar results, yet are distinct phenomena (Gilbert & Malone, 
1995). In a general sense, attribution theories describe the ways in which humans 
perceive and explain the observed behavior of others. Attributions are typically split into 
two categories: internal and external (Heider, 1958). When a person observes the 
behavior of another and they begin to ask themselves why that person did what they did, 
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they will typically explain it in one of two ways: either as a result of internal 
characteristics such as a personality trait or as a result of external influences such as peer 
pressure. The former is what social psychologists call internal attributions, while the 
latter are referred to as external attributions (Gilbert & Malone, 1995; Heider, 1958; 
Peturson, Cramer & Pomerleau, 2011; Ross, Amabile & Steinmetz, 1977).  
The Fundamental Attribution Error 
As previously mentioned, internal and external attributions are key components to 
a variety of related theories. Among these theories rest the focus of this study: The 
Fundamental Attribution Error (FAE). FAE refers to the tendency for humans to make 
internal attributions rather than external attributions when explaining observed behavior 
(Eberhardt, 1999; Gilbert & Malone, 1995; Heider, 1958; Ross, Amabile & Steinmetz, 
1977; Skitka, Mullen, Griffin, Hutchinson & Chamberlin, 2002). However, even with this 
definition, FAE is best understood when put in the context of everyday occurrences. For 
example, imagine a person who slipped while walking down a flight of stairs, causing 
them to significantly injure themselves. For the sake of this example, it would be 
important to note that their accident was due to an uncontrollable yet minor external force 
(i.e. the stairs were slick in that one spot, they tripped over something unseen etc.). When 
a nearby witness instinctively wondered why that person fell, it would be automatic for 
them to assume it was because that person was clumsy. It should be noted that this 
process seems to be an instinctive cognitive function that occurs without the observer 
deliberately contemplating the event (Gilbert & Malone, 1995; Skitka et al., 2002). FAE 
can be extended to a variety of situations, including ones more harmless than our 
previous example, such as a student who is ten minutes late to class. Instead of 
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considering that student may have been the victim of a shoddy bus schedule, a professor 
and surrounding classmates might assume that student is late because they are lazy or 
irresponsible.  
 Although attribution theories have been a prominent topic in social psychology 
since Fritz Heider (1958) proposed them, FAE was not introduced to the psychological 
literature for another 20 years (Ross, 1977). The error was initially proposed by Lee Ross 
following his classic experiment commonly dubbed the quizmaster paradigm (Ross et al., 
1977). In this original paradigm, participants completed a mock game show where they 
were assigned to one of three roles: quizmasters, contestants, and observers. As the 
names suggest, quizmasters asked ten general knowledge questions from their own 
knowledge bank, contestants attempted to answer these questions, and observers 
observed the quiz game. As to be expected, contestants largely failed to answer the 
questions correctly. However, when asked to rate the intelligence of quizmasters and 
contestants, observers consistently rated quizmasters as more intelligent than contestants, 
despite clear situational constraints (Gilbert & Malone, 1995; Ross et al., 1977). The 
effects of this paradigm are proven to be robust and consistent (Gilbert & Malone, 1995; 
Krull et al., 1999; Peturson et al., 2011; Skitka et al., 2002 etc.). 
Following the introduction of attributions and FAE, a wide array of psychological 
research has been devoted to understanding their specific mechanisms. However, most of 
the existing literature investigate how people commit the error, rather than why. Research 
suggests that people commit FAE instinctively and automatically, meaning that it often 
occurs without deliberate cognitive effort on the part of the observer (Gilbert & Malone, 
1995; Skitka et al., 2002). A prominent overview of the literature regarding general 
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attribution theories outlines general attributions as occurring in four steps that largely 
revolve around assessing a situation and determining typical behavior in that situation. If 
an actor’s behavior falls within expected norms, then external attributions will be made. 
However, if an actor’s behavior falls outside of expected norms, then internal attributions 
will be made (Gilbert & Malone, 1995). In the previously described quizmaster 
paradigm, observers assessed the situation of the mock quiz game, however they 
incorrectly assessed the true difficulty of the task contestants were assigned to. Therefore, 
their incorrect assessment caused them to determine typical behavior from a perception of 
the situation that did not reflect reality (Gilbert & Malone, 1995). Thus, when a 
contestant failed to answer most of the questions, observers attributed this to a lack of 
intelligence due to their fundamental misunderstanding of the situation. Alternatively, 
research shows that even after an internal attribution has been formed, it can be rejected if 
there is proper motivation to do so (Skitka et al., 2002).  
Deprivation of Control  
 Now that the process of how people commit FAE has been established, it is time 
to ask ourselves why people commit it. Although several theories exist to generally 
explain why attributions are made, very little time has been taken to empirically examine 
any of these theories in the context of FAE. One commonly proposed, yet largely 
untested theory, is that of control. It is well established throughout social psychology that 
people crave control. Thus, depriving them of control causes them to seek out systems 
and strategies to reestablish it (Heider, 1958; Kelley, 1969; Kelley, 1971; Landau, Kay & 
Whitson, 2015; Liu & Steele, 1986; Ma, Landau, Narayanan & Kay, 2017; Pittman & 
Pittman, 1980; Rothbaum, Weisz & Snyder, 1982).  
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Attributions have been proposed as a strategy for reestablishing control since the 
inception of attribution theories (Heider, 1958). While Heider agreed that establishing 
control is a possible explanation (Harvey, Ickes, & Kidd, 1976), one of the most well-
known arguments for control as a motivator came from famed social psychologist Harold 
Kelley (1971). According to him, attributing an outcome to an internal characteristic 
gives people the notion that the outcome will be repeated, since internal characteristics 
are presumably constant, and thus can be predicted and viewed as controllable (Harvey et 
al., 1976; Kelley, 1969; Kelley, 1971). An analysis of the relationship between 
attributions and control found that people often minimize chance as a contributor to 
unrelated events and minimize the role of situational constraints to both personal and 
impersonal predicaments (Wortman, 1976). It must be noted that this study did not 
investigate attributions regarding observed persons, but the role of self-attributions in 
establishing environmental control. However, this trend of minimizing chance and 
situational constraints to avoid unpredictable outcomes provides a fundamental basis for 
why people form internal attributions.  
Expanding on this idea, Pittman and Pittman (1980) found that increasing 
deprivation of control in participants resulted in more extreme internal attributions. This 
study provided evidence for the hypothesis that depriving people of control increases the 
motivation to reestablish control through internal attributions. However, it must be noted 
that this experiment did not investigate FAE, but a related attribution theory called the 
observer bias (Gilbert & Malone, 1995; Jones & Harris, 1967; Liu & Steele, 1986; 
Pittman & Pittman, 1980). Even though both FAE and the observer bias describe how 
perceived behavior and internal attributions intersect, there is one important difference 
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that distinguishes them. In the quizmaster paradigm, contestants are constrained by what 
is called a behavioral constraint (Gilbert & Malone, 1995). In this type of situational 
constraint, actors behave as they do because their options are limited due to an external 
factor. Within the quizmaster paradigm, contestants are constrained by the inane 
questions of the quizmaster. Thus, if the contestant does not know the answer to the 
question their behavior is limited to answering incorrectly, despite their own wants, 
feelings, thoughts, or desires (Gilbert & Malone, 1995). The paradigm used by Pittman 
and Pittman (1980) differs in that participants read a student essay in favor of Fidel 
Castro, wherein half of the participants were told students were free to choose their 
stance and the other half were told students were assigned stances by their instructor. 
Given the effects of attributions, participants in both conditions unsurprisingly believed 
that the student held pro-Castro beliefs, even with the knowledge that the student had 
been assigned the position (Jones & Harris, 1967; Liu & Steele, 1986; Pittman & 
Pittman, 1980). This paradigm relies on what is called a psychological constraint (Gilbert 
& Malone, 1995). This constraint differs from behavioral constraints in that the situation 
does not directly limit an actor’s options. Instead, it simply changes their perception of 
those options. Theoretically, the student assigned to the pro-Castro stance could write an 
anti-Castro essay, however the motivation of obtaining a good grade limits their behavior.  
Although this difference may seem pedantic, it is an important distinction that 
separates FAE and the observer bias as two different paradigms that produce similar 
results. Thus, while ample literature exists to suggest control could be a motive for 
committing FAE, no studies exist that specifically and empirically investigate their 
relationship. Assuming control is a motivation for making internal attributions, the main 
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hypothesis of this study is that when people are deprived of a personal sense of control 
they will be more likely to make more extreme internal attributions in the context of 
FAE. 
If this hypothesis is not rejected, then this research will provide a working theory 
to explain one of social psychology’s most fundamental phenomena. Much analysis 
surrounding attributions have theorized control as an explanation, but little experimental 
research exists to confirm this and no research specifically investigates FAE. This study 
aims to correct the gap in the current literature and solidify the theory of control as a 
viable explanation for why attributions are spontaneously created. 
Racial Stereotyping Biases  
With a viable hypothesis established for why we ask why, its time to investigate 
the different contexts that may affect the strength of internal attributions. A secondary 
aim of this study is to analyze the ways racial stereotypes and internal attributions 
intersect within the context of FAE. It is well-acknowledged within the psychological 
field that black people are commonly stereotyped as unintelligent (Devine & Elliot, 1995; 
Kobach & Potter, 2013; Steele, 1997; Steele & Aronson, 1995; Yoo & Pituc, 2013). 
Additionally, research suggests that most contemporary racial stereotypes are expressed 
through implicit racism, or racism that is unconscious and often masked by mitigating 
factors (Banaji & Greenwald, 2013; Dovidio, Kawakami & Gaertner, 2002; Fiske, 2000; 
Greenwald & Banaji, 1995) In the context of FAE, this means that observers who watch a 
mock quiz game involving a black contestant and a white quizmaster might be motivated 
by racial stereotypes to rate black contestants as exceptionally unintelligent when 
compared to a white contestant. However, instead of attributing their low ratings of black 
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contestants to racial stereotypes, observers can highlight the contestants’ inability to 
answer questions in a distinct example of implicit racism. Although no research to my 
knowledge exists that examines the effect of racial stereotypes on FAE, several studies 
have found evidence for a general link between racial stereotypes and attributions (Hart 
& Morry, 1996; Lukyste, Waite, Avery & Roy, 2013; Miller, Baer & Staggenborg, 1977).  
Similarly, research suggests that FAE and gender stereotypes intersect. In fact, 
when observers are presented with gender minorities and aren’t aware they might be 
relying on stereotypes, observers will be more likely to rate female contestants as less 
intelligent than comparable male contestants (Peturson et al., 2011). Due to the literature 
which links attributions and racial stereotypes, there is no reason to think racial 
stereotypes and FAE would interact differently than gender stereotypes and FAE.  
Although FAE is a convenient model for participants to express implicit racism, it 
does not explain why participants might rely on stereotypes when making internal 
attributions. One prominent explanation is the idea of salience. Research shows that 
changing the prominence of a point of view can cause people to attribute more 
importance to and be more reliant on what is visually salient in that point of view (Duval, 
Duval & Neely, 1979; Storms, 1973). Moreover, observers tend to make more extreme 
attributions about stimuli that has been made more salient (McArthur & Solomon, 1978; 
Morry, 1996; Taylor, Fiske, Etcoff & Ruderman, 1978). This can further be applied to the 
salience of race. In terms of racial biases, psychologists theorize that observers find 
members of outgroups (i.e. racial minorities) to be more salient when compared to 
ingroup members (Fiske, 2000). Thus, given the impact salient features can have on point 
of view and the evidence for race as a salient feature, evidence suggests that participants 
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would emphasize the importance of race in black contestants participating in the 
quizmaster paradigm. This may trigger implicit stereotypes of unintelligence regarding 
black people observers hold, therefore causing participants to rate black contestants lower 
than white contestants. 
Given the existing literature, it is expected that when participants view the mock 
quiz game devised by Ross et al. (1977) with a white quizmaster and black contestant, 
they will make more extreme internal attributions regarding the intelligence of the black 
contestant when compared to a white contestant. Although research suggests that FAE 
can be affected by gender stereotypes, very little data similarly links racial stereotypes 
and FAE. If this study finds support for this link, then this will showcase the widespread 
impact of implicit racial biases.  
Current Research  
 The culmination of the current research suggests control as a viable motivator for 
creating internal attributions, with racial stereotypes acting as a secondary effect.  The 
present study thus investigates the legitimacy of the control hypothesis using the 
previously described quizmaster paradigm.  Participants completed a manipulation which 
either deprived them of self-control or had no effect on their self-control before viewing a 
video of a quizmaster scenario. Additionally, participants either viewed a video with a 
black contestant or a white contestant. I hypothesize that participants who are deprived of 
control will be more likely to make extreme internal attributions regarding the contestant. 
Similarly, participants who observe a black contestant will be more likely to make 
extreme internal attributions regarding the contestant when compared to those who 
observe a white contestant. Finally, I hypothesize that these two variables will interact 
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and participants who were deprived of control and viewed a black contestant will be the 
most likely to make the most extreme internal attributions. 
Method  
Participants  
377 participants (Mage = 19.15, SD = 2.49, age range: 18-53 years) were recruited 
from a pool of University of Arkansas students enrolled in an introductory psychology 
course. As compensation for participating, they received credit to fulfill a course 
requirement. The majority of participants were female (71.7%) and White (78.8%). 
However Hispanic (7.1%), Black (5.3%), Asian (3.2%) and Native American (1.9%) 
participants were also present. A total of 3.4% participants additionally identified as 
“Other”. 
Construction of Stimuli  
The four videos utilized in this study were modeled after Ross’ quizmaster 
paradigm (1977) and were constructed using participants from a previous study. 
Participants (N = 14) were University of Arkansas students enrolled in an introductory 
psychology course and were selected from a prescreening survey. Participants were 
recruited through email and were only selected if they marked their race as either White 
or Black in the prescreening survey. Upon entering the lab, participants were paired with 
a confederate who was consistent among all sessions. Participants were then assigned to 
the role of the contestant, while the confederate was assigned to the role of the 
quizmaster. Participants were led to believe that the roles of quizmaster and contestant 
were randomly assigned. Following role assignments, the research assistant explained 
that the session would be videotaped and, after obtaining audible consent, began 
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videotaping the remainder of the session. The research assistant proceeded to explain the 
format of the trivia scenario and the quizmaster and contestant roles. The research 
assistant instructed the quizmaster to generate ten general knowledge questions. 
However, the ten questions were consistent across all sessions. Following this, the 
research assistant instructed them to ask the contestant all of their questions within a ten-
minute time period. If the contestant did not answer the question correctly, the research 
assistant instructed the quizmaster to give the correct answer.  
 Following the conclusion of the trivia scenario, the research assistant stopped the 
video recording, dismissed the confederate and debriefed the participant. Participants 
were informed that their video might be used in a future study and their verbal consent 
was obtained. Finally, participants were asked to not reveal any of the study’s details 
before being thanked for their time. 
 From the videos obtained from these sessions, four were ultimately chosen. Two 
of the videos showed a black contestant and the remaining two videos showed a white 
contestant. All the videos were selected based on time of the video, clarity of the video, 
clarity of contestant race, and mood of the contestant. In order to ensure the videos were 
consistent across these variables, two of the videos chosen included a contestant who 
answered one question correctly and two included a contestant who answered no 
questions correctly. Of the two videos with contestants who answered one question 
correctly, one contestant was black and the other was white. Similarly, between the two 
videos of contestants who answered no questions correctly, one contestant was black and 
the other contestant was white. No a priori hypothesis existed regarding the number of 
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correct answers and preliminary analysis showed no significant effect of this variable. 
Thus, all further analysis collapses over this variable. 
Procedure 
This study was a 2 (contestant race; black contestant, white contestant) x 2 
(control; deprivation of control, no deprivation of control) between-subjects design. All 
participants completed an online survey which consisted of a personal control 
manipulation, a video, several sets of questions, and a symbolic racism scale.  The survey 
began with the personal control manipulation, which was presented as a memory task 
with two variations. The memory task was originally created by Kay et al. (2008) to 
manipulate personal control. Participants were asked to “Please try and think of 
something positive that happened to you in the few months that was [not] your fault (i.e., 
that you had [absolutely no] control over). Please describe this event as vividly as you 
can in 4-6 sentences,” (Kay et al., 2008). 
 On the following page, participants read a brief excerpt explaining the trivia 
scenario they were about to watch. The excerpt explained that the quizmaster and 
contestant were participants in a previous study and that their roles were randomly 
assigned. After reading this page, participants viewed one of the four videos. The videos 
began with an off-screen research assistant giving instructions to the quizmaster 
regarding question generation. Although the videos showed the quizmaster creating their 
questions, these sections of the videos were sped up to maintain participant interest. The 
remainder of the videos followed the procedure outlined previously. Once the quizmaster 
and contestant finished the trivia game, the videos ended. All the videos lasted in between 
four minutes and twenty seconds and four minutes and forty seconds.   
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 After viewing the video, participants rated the relative intelligence and general 
knowledge of the quizmaster, the contestant, and themselves using a 100 point Likert 
scale similar to that used by Ross et al. (1997). It was noted within the instructions that 0 
represented an extremely small amount of intelligence or general knowledge and 100 
represented an extremely large amount of intelligence or general knowledge. For the 
purposes of data analysis, the intelligence and general knowledge items were combined 
into composite scores for both quizmasters r(377) = .435, p <  .001 and contestants 
r(377) = .598, p < .001. An additional item was presented to participants that asked them 
to rate how likely they thought the contestant or quizmaster would succeed at a general 
knowledge-based game show on a100 point Likert scale similar to those used for the 
previous two items. This question was exploratory and thus was removed from 
subsequent analysis. Other items on the questionnaire included several attention checks. 
Following the completion of this questionnaire, participants finished the study with the 
symbolic racism scale (Henry & Sears, 2002). Typical items on this scale asked 
participants to rate how much they agreed with statements such as, “It’s really a matter of 
some people not trying hard enough; if blacks would only try harder they could be just as 
well off as whites,” or asked their opinions of statements such as, “Some say that black 
leaders have been trying to push too fast. Others feel that they haven’t pushed fast 
enough.  What do you think?”  The items on this scale were reverse scored where 
necessary and then averaged to form a symbolic racism index (α = .80).1 
 The study concluded with a debriefing page that described the research 
hypotheses, asked participants to not discuss the details of the study with potential 
participants, and thanked them for their time. 
WHY WE ASK WHY                                                                                                             18 
 
Results  
 First, I hypothesized that the results of this study would replicate the results of 
Ross et al. (1977); in that study, contestants were consistently rated lower in intelligence 
when compared to quizmasters (as is the primary expression of FAE). I additionally 
hypothesized that participants deprived of personal control will be more likely to make 
stronger internal attributions regarding contestants, as will those who view a black 
contestant versus a white contestant. Finally, I predicted that the attributes of control and 
contestant race would interact. Within this interaction, I hypothesized that participants 
exposed to a black contestant and deprivation of personal control would be the most 
likely to make the most extreme internal attributions. In order to test the interaction 
between these variables, a difference score between the composite intelligence scores of 
quizmasters and contestants was computed and used for analysis. 
Attention checks  
 Attention was successfully held in most participants. Following the items testing 
perceived general knowledge and intelligence of the quizmasters and contestants, 
participants were asked to answer several attention checks. The first two of these checks 
asked contestants to report the race of the quizmaster and of the contestant. Of all the 
participants, only eight misreported the race of the quizmaster and five misreported the 
race of the contestant. The third attention check asked participants to report how many 
questions the contestant answered correctly. Overall, only seven participants significantly 
misreported the number of questions answered correctly, wherein a margin of error of 
three questions was considered significant. The final attention check asked participants to 
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list as many questions as they could from the video. Only twenty-four participants were 
unable to identify at least five of the ten questions.2 
Primary Analysis  
 To test the first prediction, a paired sample t-test was conducted. This analysis 
supported the original results of Ross et al. (1977), wherein quizmasters (M = 77.63, SD 
= 13.24) were considered more intelligent than contestants (M = 48.14, SD = 14.34), 
t(375) = 30.04, p < .01. 
In order to test the remaining hypotheses, three separate Race (black contestant, 
white contestant) x Control (deprivation of control, no deprivation of control) analysis of 
variances (ANOVAs) were conducted.3 The first of these ANOVAs used the composite 
intelligence score for the quizmaster. Between the two main effects of Race and Control, 
no significant difference was found for either, F(1, 373) = 1.66, p < .20 and F(1, 373) = 
.344, p < .56 respectively. Additionally, there was no significant interaction between 
Race and Control, F(1, 373) = .035, p < .86. When participants were deprived of control, 
they did not rate quizmasters different when viewing white or black contestants (M = 
78.77, SD = 13.18) and (M = 77.27, SD = 12.16) respectively. Similarly, when 
participants were not deprived of control, quizmasters were rated similarly across both 
the white and black contestant conditions (M = 78.23, SD = 14.10) and (M = 76.12, SD 
= 13.53) respectively. 
 The second ANOVA used the composite score of contestant intelligence. 
Similarly, no main effects were found for either of the variables of Race or Control, F(1, 
372) = 1.26, p < .27 and F(1, 372) = .001, p < .98 respectively. Additionally, no 
significant evidence was found to suggest an interaction between Race and Control, F(1, 
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372) = .011, p < .92. Participants who were deprived of control did not rate white or 
black contestants differently, (M = 48.87, SD = 14.89) and (M = 47.36, SD = 13.29) 
respectively. Participants who were not deprived of control also did not rate white or 
black contestants differently, (M = 49.07, SD = 14.29) and (M = 47.25, SD = 14.98) 
respectively. 
 The third ANOVA used the difference score between quizmasters and 
contestants. Again, no main effects were found for either Race or Control, F(1, 372) = 
.002, p < .97 and F(1, 372) = .183, p < .669 respectively. No significant interaction was 
found between the variables of Race and Control, F(1, 372) = .002, p < .97. Participants 
who were deprived of control did not significantly rate contestants higher or lower than 
quizmasters when presented with a white or black contestant, (M = 29.90, SD = 18.13) 
and (M = 29.92, SD = 19.93) respectively. Similarly, participants who were not deprived 
of control did not rate contestants higher or lower than quizmasters when presented with 
either a white or black contestant, (M = 29.16, SD = 19.89) and (M = 28.97, SD = 18.41) 
respectively.  
Discussion 
 In this study, I explored the intersections and the effect of personal control and 
racial stereotyping on the expression of internal attributions. To my knowledge, this study 
is one of the first to investigate the relationship between racial stereotyping and FAE. In 
addition, it is the first to analyze the relationship between personal control and FAE 
specifically. It is also the first to investigate possible interactions between control and 
racial stereotyping. 
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 In line with Ross et al. (1977) and the existing literature, the quizmaster paradigm 
was shown to be robust.  Participants consistently and significantly rated quizmasters as 
more intelligent than contestants, despite clear situational constraints. However, the 
results of this study stand in contrast to the proposed hypotheses in all other aspects. 
While some evidence suggests that depriving participants of control will lead to them 
creating more extreme internal attributions within the observer bias (Liu & Steele, 1986; 
Pittman & Pittman, 1980), this effect was not found in the context of FAE. Participants 
who described a positive event they had no control over did not significantly rate 
contestants any lower or higher than participants who described a positive event they had 
control over. 
 Two secondary hypotheses also explored the effect of racial biases and whether 
Race and Control would interact to affect the internal attributions made regarding 
contestants.  The results of this study do not support either of these secondary hypotheses. 
When participants were presented with black contestants, they were not more likely to 
rate them lower in intelligence than participants presented with white contestants. This 
lack of difference between perceptions of white and black contestants contrasts with 
results from a previous study, which showed that biases against marginalized 
communities could elicit a difference in contestant ratings (Peturson et al., 2011). 
Furthermore, no evidence was found to support an interaction between Control and Race. 
Participants who experienced both the control manipulation and a black contestant were 
no more likely to rate contestant intelligence lower than other participants. 
Explaining the Results 
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 In conclusion, the results of this study did not support any of the proposed 
hypotheses, aside from confirming the quizmaster paradigm. These results provide a 
contrast to the existing studies that investigate how these variables affect internal 
attributions (Liu & Steele, 1986; Peturson et al., 2011; Pittman & Pittman, 1980). 
However, the current study differs from these previous studies in fundamental ways 
which may explain our results.  
In regards to the control manipulation, this study utilized a different methodology 
than what was used by Pittman and Pittman in 1980 and later replicated by Liu and Steele 
(1986). This study replicated a survey item used by Kay et al. (2008) in a study 
examining how control and religious beliefs interact. Although that study does not relate 
to the attribution theories investigated here, it seemed to provide a statistically significant 
control manipulation that fit well with this study’s methodology. Whereas the control 
manipulation used by Pittman and Pittman (1980) required multiple research assistants 
and a significant amount of time, the chosen manipulation lent itself well to an online 
survey format and was compatible with study sessions that ran multiple participants at 
once. Before continuing with this explanatory discussion, it should be noted that the 
Pittman and Pittman (1980) manipulation and the Kay et al. (2008) manipulation were 
derived from two distinct psychological approaches regarding control. Whereas Pittman 
and Pittman (1980) relied on the learned helplessness approach, Kay et al. (2008) relied 
on compensatory control. However, simply because their manipulations were derived 
from different approaches does not mean that they cannot provide a similar effect in 
participants. In fact, no research to my knowledge exists that suggests these two 
approaches might produce different worldviews.  
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 Despite the previously stated factors and evidence, further investigation indicates 
that the chosen manipulation may not have been effective in depriving participants of 
control. A manipulation check for control was not included in the measures participants 
completed, thus subsequent implications are drawn from extrapolations of the data. A 
closer look at the data reveals that the instructions for the control manipulation may have 
been unsuccessful. By instructing participants to write “4-6 sentences” about their 
experiences, this introduced an unpredicted level of variability. Participants who met the 
bare minimum of four sentences may have done so with four brief sentences that may not 
have invoked descriptive enough thoughts of the situation to affect feelings of control. 
Due to this variability, even a participant who wrote six such brief sentences may not 
have been impacted by the manipulation as much as a participant who wrote four lavishly 
detailed sentences. Thus, instructing participants to answer based on a number of 
sentences was not a standardized approach. Due to the lack of standardization, 
participants may not have been as immersed in their past experiences as needed to evoke 
the desired effect. 
 Alternatively, attention checks suggest that the Race manipulation was successful. 
As previously stated, only five out of all participants misreported the race of the 
contestant. It is likely that inattention can account for the small number of participants 
who misreported contestant race, rather than ambiguity or confusion of their race. Thus, it 
is reasonable to believe that the Race manipulation was successful. Despite robust 
literature which suggest stereotypes regarding black intelligence are ingrained in 
American culture (Devine & Elliot, 1995; Kobach & Potter, 2013; Steele, 1997; Steele & 
Aronson, 1995; Yoo & Pituc, 2013), there are several mitigating factors which may 
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explain the results pertaining to the Race variable. First, due to constraints involving the 
videos available for selection, participants only viewed female contestants. It is possible 
that using only female contestants may have affected the expression of stereotyping 
attitudes. There is no study to my knowledge that analyzes possible differences between 
stereotypes of black women and men or that specifically investigates stereotypes of 
intelligence regarding black women. Rather, much of the existing literature focusing on 
black women revolves around perceptions of sexuality and emotional depth (Cooley, 
Winslow, Vojt, Shein & Ho, 2018; Rosenthal & Lobel, 2016; Smith, LaFrance & 
Dovidio, 2017). In addition, research suggests that the intersection of gender and race in 
black women plays an important role in creating new stereotypes. In other words, the 
stereotypes applied to black women are unique and more than simply a combination of 
the stereotypes typically applied to black men and white women (Ghavami & Peplau, 
2013). Thus, it is possible that contestant ratings did not differ between black and white 
contestants due to different stereotypes associated with black men and women.  
 Another explanation of the results lies in the concept of individuating information. 
Individuating information relies on the idea that people tend to rely on stereotypes when 
they lack individual information about a target. However, when distinct and unique 
information about this target is acquired, people are less likely to rely on stereotypes 
(Fiske, Lin, & Neuberg, 1999; Singletary & Hebl, 2009). In terms of racial biases, this 
concept applies in that negative racial stereotypes will be more strongly and frequently 
endorsed when ambiguity is present (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2000). For example, when 
employers were asked to rate black and white candidates for a job, there was no 
difference between their ratings of the two racial groups when looking at exceptionally 
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weak or strong applications. However, implicit racial bias became apparent when 
researchers compared ratings of average black candidates and average white candidates 
(Dovidio & Gaertner, 2000). This phenomenon is due to exceptionally weak or strong 
applications acting as individuating information for those candidates. However, when 
neither high nor low performance existed to individuate the black candidate, raters 
resorted to stereotypes. This model may also be applied to the quizmaster paradigm. 
When participants viewed black contestants answering less questions than expected, this 
may have had a similar effect as a weak black candidate for a job. In other words, their 
poor performance may have individuated them, thus mitigating the expression of negative 
stereotypes. 
Limitations  
 It is important to remain aware that the findings of this study are limited to the 
context of the chosen methodology. As outlined above, the control manipulation and 
videos were inherently limited in their scope. The lack of a standardized word count on 
the control manipulation and the use of only female contestants are both factors which 
may have limited the results of the study, as did a lack of a manipulation check. 
Furthermore, the quizmaster paradigm presents a highly specific context for the existence 
of FAE, which may not be generalizable to everyday occurrences. Due to this, this study 
cannot attest to how often FAE is committed or how generalizable it is. 
 It is also important to note that the source of the participant pool additionally 
limits the study. All participants were college students, with the mean age around 
nineteen years old. This inherently limits the generalizability of the results to more 
diverse populations in terms of age, gender, and race. 
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Implications  
 Despite the null results regarding Race and Control, this study highlights the 
robustness of FAE and internal attributions. Even under a modified version of the 
quizmaster paradigm, participants consistently rated quizmasters as more intelligent than 
contestants. This adds to the existing support for internal attributions, which are held up 
by a strong tradition of psychological research. Attribution theories were proposed over 
sixty years ago, yet their importance within social psychology has persisted. The various 
phenomena that attribution theories encompass have withstood multiple replications and 
have been applied to a wide variety of subfields, including clinical, cognitive, and 
evolutionary psychology (Gilbert & Malone, 1995; Jones & Harris, 1967; Liu & Steele, 
1986; Peturson et al., 2011; Pittman & Pittman, 1980; Ross et al., 1977;). 
Despite the importance and widespread application of attribution theories, our 
grasp of their mechanics is still limited. Given the null results of this study, this may be 
attributed to the complexity of the mechanisms involved in attribution theories. In their 
extensive literature review, Gilbert and Malone proposed that the control hypothesis 
alone was insufficient in explaining attribution theories (1995). Instead, the authors 
mused that perhaps it was a combination of control and culture that created the 
intersections of control and attributional theories. According to them, humans have many 
methods for reestablishing control, however internal attributions seem to be the method 
preferred by Western cultural norms (Gilbert & Malone, 1995).  
Admittedly, the addition of culture to the control hypothesis does not directly 
explain this study or its results. The majority – if not all – of the participants in this study 
were products of Western cultural norms. However, it adds a level of depth to the original 
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control hypothesis that naturally leads to the following question: are attribution theories 
more complicated than we originally thought? For years following their inception, 
hypotheses regarding their causality were neat and self-contained. The control hypothesis 
was included among these neat theories. However, perhaps attribution theories cannot be 
explained with one neat theory, but instead exist at the intersection of multiple, complex 
variables.  
Given the multiple theories that exist and the little robust empirical evidence to 
support them, further research should be devoted to the causality of attribution theories. 
On one hand, perhaps internal attributions can be explained by the original control 
hypothesis and the null results of this study are purely a result of an ineffective 
manipulation. On the other hand, perhaps internal attributions are caused by several 
variables which interact at varying levels. Without further research, there is no way to 
determine the truth. This gap in the literature should be remedied, especially considering 
the prominence attribution theories hold in social psychology. 
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Footnotes 
     1 The Symbolic Racism Scale was an exploratory item. Analysis showed that the index 
created from this scale did not intersect or interact with the data in any significant way. 
Due to this, this item is not discussed further in the text. 
     2 More Stringent standards, where those who missed these checks were excluded from 
analysis, did not alter the findings in any way. 
     3 As a reminder to the reader, all subsequent analysis collapses across the number of 
questions contestants answered correctly. 
 
 
